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AbstractThe rapid growth of modern long-distance communication technologies both in term of quality and quantity and the consequent emergence 
of cyberspace in parallel with the real world, has led to new forms of 
inequality which can be interpreted in three different ways. Using the 
three-generation theory of social networks (Oral networks; Long-
distance networks; and, Digital networks), one can make domestic 
comparisons, and find countries in which the majority of the population 
are within the third category or the digital network. On the other side 
of the extreme, are nations who are still under the limited conditions 
of the first and second categories of oral and long-distance networking. This paper presents a chart using a combination of different statistical indicators to illustrate the inequality in question. The focus of this paper 
has been on the two countries of Iran and the United States as its case 
study. The conclusion at the end suggests that tackling and reducing the inequality in question has to do with ‘national will and national facilities’ as well as ‘individual will and individual facilities’.
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Introduction 
When for the first time the concept of ‘global inequality’ was 
brought to light in the late 20th century, the focus was mostly 
on issues such as lack of education in Asia compared to Europe, 
how scarce food resources were in Africa, while they were 
considerably abundant in North America and Europe as well as 
income per capita, gross domestic production and other similar standards which were tremendously higher in some parts of the world than in other parts. All the statistics were indicative 
of inequalities and injustices at a global level. Nowadays, a new form of inequality has emerged that can be explored from three 
different perspectives: A- The Communication Ecosystem Theory, B- The Global Dual Spacization and C- The Three-Generation 
Theory of Social Networks 
The Communication Ecosystem Theory
In 1970, that is 45 years before the introduction of the notion 
of ‘communication ecosystem’, the term ‘media ecology’ was coined by American author and media theorist Neil Postman. He referred to media ecology as the symbolic relationships 
existing among people, the media technology and the way they’re 
consumed (Postman, 2000, p. 10-16). For example, an idea was 
formulated when a 2012 field research project was launched on the content and the way four visual messages were received in six different countries (1). The results led to the hypothesis 
that the communications world is changing. Indeed it says, the audience of the media used to be the masses in the past but now they have changed into messages which are ‘massed’ in both their 
forms (written, visual and audio) and content, thus, establishing a certain communication ecosystem. A communication ecosystem 
is defined based on the model of the original concept of ecosystem which is the interaction of organisms (such as different masses of living creatures in a certain geographical environment) with material (such as soil in the same geographical environment) 
and energy (such as sunlight, wind, etc.) (Blew, 1996, p. 171-
173; Tansley, 1935, p. 284-307). Now, likewise, any written, oral 
and visual content, which under the influence of some source 
of power, is ‘massed’ will be considered as equal to organism in the communication ecosystem. The material here are all the 
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communication tools ranging from postmen on horse-back 
in ancient times, to stamped letters in the post box, telegram, 
telephone, books, newspapers, radio, television, etc. to more 
modern-day means such as the internet, weblogs and websites. 
In addition, the third concept of energy is defined under norms 
written or non-written, as well as rules and regulations. The 
interaction between these three elements would be the definition 
of a communication ecosystem (Figure 1) which is an umbrella 
notion covering all communication contexts (Mohsenian Rad, 2015, 
p. 11). These days, massed messaging is mainly a phenomenon 
which involves the participation of the communicator who makes use of modern tools to share a particular message on cyberspace 
and therefore plays the simultaneous role of the sender/receiver 
or the communicator/communicated. In the past, that power was at the hands of ruthless rulers and dictators. One such example of 
a massed message is former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s 
‘Green Book’. It can also appear in the form of portraits of 
authoritarian rulers on the streets and huge walls, on schoolbook 
first pages, the front of theatres, on bank notes and coins and a host of other places. 
At times, the format is of a massed message. For example, one could refer to the era prior to modern-day communication 
tools, when in most countries even the developing ones massed 
messages would come in audio format, that is people’s direct 
conversations or the radio broadcasting, rather than telegrams, 
letters, newspaper or books. 
 
Figure 1. The ecosystem created as a result of the interaction among material, energy 
and living creatures (Tansley, 1935, p. 284-307), as compared to the communication 
ecosystem produced by the interaction among communication tools, norms and massed 
messages (both in form and content) (Mohsenian Rad, 2015, p. 11). 
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Despite the latest modern-day developments in media 
communication tools, one can easily detect the different formats of massed messaging in two different communication ecosystems. One example is the massive volume of written messages that come with commodities in developed countries compared to underdeveloped countries. ‘Communication ecosystems’ are quite different from ‘communication climates’ as termed by 
Ronald B. Adler and divided into such categories as warm, 
calm, cold and stormy. Still, the definition is closely related to 
that of a communication ecosystem. In fact, in communication ecosystems one may encounter varying climate conditions at 
different times, just the way Adler refers to it as stable and 
unstable. Something that may look calm at one moment can turn turbulent at the next. Calculating a communication climate is 
indeed not as simple as looking at a thermometer. In fact, here (in communication ecosystems) the criterion is the warmth and emotional status covering the relationship between the two sides 
of the communication (Adler, 2009, p.206). For an instance the 
climate change in the communication ecosystem, one may refer 
to what happened in January 7, 2014 in France. The message of 
the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo office and journalists in 
Paris was mass messaged in the first few hours more in audio-
visual form than in any other medium. As a matter of fact, as 
with the world of nature, where some environments are favored 
as pleasant ecosystems while others are unbearable, the world of media shares the same quality when it comes to the potential possibility for a message with a certain content or form to mass messaged. 
The Dual Spacization Theory 
On the debate on ‘virtual space’, the paradigm of ‘the Dual 
Spacization of the World’, referring to the real and virtual spaces, 
was introduced and developed by Saeid Reza Ameli, who argues that one cannot gain an understanding of the world by merely grasping the real world alone and relying on the one-space 
notion. Indeed, both need to be simultaneously understood. 
In other words, understanding the virtual space without 
considering the factors of the real world makes one’s outlook and 
the whole study flawed (Ameli, 2011, p. 24). To study the virtual 
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space, Ameli takes meta-factors as parameters which influence 
everything, arguing that elements such as ‘speeding-up of space’, 
‘comprehensiveness’, ‘constant accessibility’, ‘meta-place’, ‘meta-
time’, ‘universality’, ‘fluidity’, ‘intensification of reality’ and the state of being ‘multi-mediated’ are among factors which affect life in the second space (virtual space) and create a double-spacized 
life (Ameli, 2011, p. 26). Each of the above-mentioned concepts 
has its own specific definition. Some are clear like ‘constant 
accessibility’, while others like ‘intensification of reality’, are 
in particular not easy to understand. Referring to Jeff Zaleski’s 
‘Soul of Cyberspace’. ‘Reality has a certain pace and continuity’, 
the reproduction of which in subjective levels of the virtual space 
has created changes in the specifications of the physical space. 
As a result, the reproduced reality is still reality However, from 
the physical space, it seems to enjoy a greater speed, intensity 
and power as it reaches individuals (Zaleski, 1997 as cited by 
Ameli, 2011, p. 29). Indeed, highlighting reality; could be the first 
factor in intensifying reality in the virtual space, one interesting 
example mentioned by Ameli as he likened it to an apple, saying a 
re-highlighted apple with an intensified reality might look better and could be tastier than the real one.
A tremendous global inequality can also be observed by taking the approach of the dual spacization theory. This inequality comes apart from those members of the world population who have a 
‘flawed understanding’ as argued by Ameli. Indeed, he addresses 
those who enjoy the chance of presence in both of the two spaces, but may have a faulty notion if they fail in  understanding the difference between the real space and the virtual space. Such a minority could be found even in developed countries such as 
the United Sates, particularly among the ageing population who 
may have no motivation for a presence in the virtual space, thus 
suffering from a flawed understanding of the world. Now, the inequality in question here has to do with societies where due 
to low levels of ‘national will and facilities’, members basically 
suffer from a low chance of participation in the virtual space, let 
alone deciding about understanding it or nor. In other words, 
there is no space at all to decide on in the first place, thus making the whole argument pointless. One clear example of such case 
is Eritrea where the internet penetration rate is only 1% and 
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about 78% of the population live in rural areas with no access 
to landline communication (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
2015a). Therefore, they basically have no chance to be exposed to the virtual space where they would face the decision whether 
to grasp it or not and avoid the flawed understanding. This is another sort of modern-day global communication inequality. 
The Three-Generation Theory 
Social networks are a series of social connections which directly connect an individual to other individuals and indirectly to a greater number of people. The connection is made possible through either direct contact or intermediary means (Mohsenian 
Rad, 2012, p. 38). The importance of social networks lies in 
the fact that they make up the individual’s social relationships 
through connections (Shepard, 2007, p. 151). The major function of these connections creates a sense of belonging in the individual and draws different types of support systems for the individual 
(Shepard, 2007, p. 153). The theory (2) states the idea that the contemporary world is experiencing a third generation of social 
networks. The first generation as exhibited in Figure 2, refers to 
oral networks made up of partial networks which are scattered, 
disconnected, thinly-linked and rarely crowded. In each partial 
network there used to be centers establishing the two-sided 
connections of the members. In Iran, those centers have been 
bazaars, coffeehouses, public baths, water storages, venues of 
mystic rituals, mourning sites, mosques, gatherings on occasions (Abolfazl charity and similar gatherings)  etc. Here, the mail carriers and pigeons have been the elements establishing the 
connections between the networks. 
Up until the 18th century, the form of social networks in the 
countries which are known today as developed nations was more or less the same as they used to be in oriental countries. It was usually a combination of a large number of small limited 
networks or partial networks. For instance, prior to the 1776 
American Revolution, the 13 colonies used to live without any 
connections together. This lack of connectivity could be justified by 
1- Geographical distance 2- Horses being the only means to travel 
and 3- The lack of communication due to wide linguistic diversity, 
such as French, German, Scottish, Ibo Ashanti and Leni-Lenape. 
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Figure 2. A mass of numerous partial networks with thinly-linked interactions relying on 
humans and animals (the first generation of social networks of universal shape) 
The second generation of social networks or ‘Tele-Networks’ 
grew during a 37-year period starting from the publication of the 
first stamps in Britain in 1840. It developed further following 
the launch of the first telegram line between Washington and 
Baltimore four years later and the first telephone line again in the 
United States in 1877  (3). The means which created the second-generation of social 
networks were rapidly developed and became widespread in 
the West. Only five years into the introduction of the telegram 
in the United States, the total length of the lines reached 10,686 
kilometers (Zahryardi, 1849, p. 1). Another example is the post 
which spread across the entire Europe in a matter of 20 years, 
technically becoming part of the lifestyle of the Europeans and 
Americans (Mosaheb, 2002, p. 669). The same holds true for the 
telephone, which rapidly spread home to home. In 1910, there 
were 7,635,400 telephone lines in the United States, around 25% 
of which had been installed in rural areas (Hardeman, 2003, p. 
232). The fast development of communication tools in the West facilitated the connection between two individuals with long 
distances through such means as the post, the telegram and the 
telephone, thus “the partial networks of the first generation were 
linked in a matter of a few decades, turning into a massive unified 
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network.” Such a development immensely impacted the structure 
and the functions of social networks. On the importance of the 
telegram, Marshal Herbert says “In most European countries, 
the telegram sparked a diversity of smaller national groups and 
intensified the continuous arrangements and mosaics…it rapidly 
weakened the centralized structure,” (McLuhan, 1998, p. 297-
300). 
The situation in the underdeveloped countries, however, was 
different, marking the first form of inter-nation inequality. There 
were three major areas of differences causing inequality: 1- The 
three major means of communication reached those countries 
much later. 2- The total share in those facilities for the general population of these countries was minor. And 3- The distribution was not homogenous. 
While analyzing the details of the differences, one comes 
across Iran and the case of interest usage. The first series of 
stamps were released in Iran in 1868 namely 28 years after they 
started being used in the West. It took four years to be used by 
an extremely low-educated society. Still, even after the majority 
of the population learned about the post and its functions, the 
spread was slow as there was a limited network that it covered. All the towns and villages across the country were not in that 
network. As a result, based on 1958 statistics, only one out of 171 
Iranians used the post once a year (Statistics Yearbook, 1966, p. 
479). Although the telegram was launched in Iran on the 13th 
anniversary of its introduction in the West, it was only used 
between two of the King’s palaces with a 2km distance. Even 14 
years later, when the line was upgraded to a 319km distance, it 
was still meant for communication between the king in Tehran 
and the prince in the city of Zanjan. In 1958, the total number of 
telegrams sent and received across Iran was 4,682 by an entire 
population of 18.5 million (Iran Statistics Yearbook 1966, p. 479).
That means only one among every 4,000 people would use the 
telegram, while the rate was five times higher in the United States 
(Historical Statistics, 1976). The status of the telephone communication was more or less 
similar. The first line was launched in Iran some 45 years after 
it was launched in La Porte, Indiana. The first Iranian network 
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comprised of 3000 lines, in 1947. During the first three years, 
no lines were added to the network and no new branches were 
launched in other parts of the country (Mo’tamedi, 1997, p. 40 - 
41). In 1958, the share of Iranians telephone usage per capita was 
extremely low, standing at 0.025 while the figure was 16.6 in the 
US, 14.3 in Sweden, 12.8 in Canada, 3.7 in Austria and 1.3 in Spain 
(Hardeman, 2003, p. 233). In other words, on the 70th anniversary 
of the invention of the telephone, the communication power of 
any member of a social network in the US was 664 times greater 
than an Iranian. In fact, all the telephone lines in Iran had been 
installed only in the capital Tehran (The Fourth Plan Report, n.d., 
p. 196), while over half a century before that, about one fourth 
of the American telephone users were in rural areas (Hardeman, 
2003, p. 232). 
As shown in Figure 3, using all the information above, one can come to the conclusion that the second generation of social 
networks in developed countries is homogenous and widespread. 
This connection was made possible through the post, the telegram 
and the telephone. As a result, the distribution was defined based on the distribution of the population and not the distance. In 
addition, due to their nature, these three means of communication would allow little room for inequality in the developed countries. 
The transition from the first generation to the second generation in underdeveloped countries which were later referred to as developing countries was different from what happened in the West as it was associated with domestic inequality. Although 
the model of social networks was transformed compared to the 
first generation, the problem was the large number of partial 
networks which were reduced to only three. The new model was 
made up of the partial networks available to those living in the 
capital, the rich, and the elite which have been illustrated in the following model in the large upper circle on the right. The model is to some extent similar to its western second-generation. 
The large circle on the left represents the majority in places where they mostly had access to the telegram but none to the telephone. There was this small minority who were unable to use 
the post due to illiteracy. They were basically stuck in the slow 
process of transition from the first to the second generation. Indeed, 
the people who still lived in the first generation of communication 
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networks were fading (people in remote villages). Such a trend, 
benefiting the educated, the rich and the city residents on the 
cost of the people living in rural areas, continued until the third 
generation of communication networks were established, leading to a rise of both domestic and inter-nation inequalities. 
Figure 3. A model of social networks formed by the telegram and the telephone in a 
developing country, Iran (a combination of the first and second generations as well as the 
transition from the first to the second generation of communication networks). The communication tools that were the basis for the virtual 
social networks and laid the foundation of the third generation 
of communication networks, shared the same specifications as 
the tools in the second generation, namely the post, the telegram 
and the telephone. But, as Shepard explains, those tools were no 
longer slow and hard to use as they were in the past (Shepard, 
2007, p.152)
Robinson (2008) as cited by Panteli (2009, p. 8) describes the 
new virtual social networks as a second life for human beings in a 
different place with a new activity. To him, the network has major 
qualities: it is multi-mediated, massive and crowded as well as it 
has multiplayers. The virtual social networks are online, creating a virtual space where one can experience a different geographical environment while they are within the internet space. Although 
here the communication does not take place in its traditional 
form, it still holds potential similarities to it (Panteli, 2009, p. 6). 
One of the advantages of virtual social networks is the facilitation of ‘social contact’. A rapidly growing the sense of group 
membership in particular networks thanks to the possibility for 
everyone to share the content of their messages (texts, pictures, audio and videos) to a list of followers who have signed up to 
receive them. Members of the third generation of social networks, 
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indeed, have new options and fresh capabilities due to new facilities which were not available to the second generation of 
social networks. At the same time, the third generation of social 
networks managed to eliminate some of the second-generation facilities. One clear example is the telegram. The same fate may await landline telephones as well. 
The capabilities of the third generation of social networks have provided the same communication among members of a 
small partial network common in the first generation of social 
networks, the only difference being that the third generation 
contacts take place in virtual space. The most popular products 
are social media networks such as Viber and Telegram, to which 
one can add Wikis, namely open-source websites accessible to all users who can add and edit their content. There are also 
podcasts, audio and video files which users share online. Another means of communication are forums where users exchange 
views on different subjects. There are also microblogs which 
are a combination of social networks and small blogs with tiny contents being updated by users. Developed countries view the third- generation of social 
networks as a crucial social resource and asset, trying to make them 
available and reachable to all members of the society (Neubeck 
& Glasberg 2004, p.106). The project aimed at providing access to everyone has already been carried out in many developed 
countries and is still growing. In 1991, only 1.4% of the employees 
in the US would telecommute. The figure rose to 5% in 1999 and 
is expected to reach 40% in 2020 (Wood, 2010, p. 252). 
Third-generation social networking in developed countries 
mainly fulfils personal communication demands rather than 
public issues. In developing nations, however, part of the users’ 
participation is meant to fill in the communication gap imposed 
by state censorship and intervention. Still, it must be noted that 
even in some developed countries, there are signs of domestic inequalities when it comes to participation in third-generation 
social networks. But here the problem is mainly the lack of individual will and not national will. It seems that the inequality with regards to access to third-generation facilities is still an issue 
in the United States too. However, the rate is much lower than in 
Iran. For instance, based on a 2013 report, 11.6% of American 
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households had no access to the internet but that’s because the 
families had no willingness to possess it. Among the rest 88.4 
households some 10.3% have a low-speed line. Still, the trend is 
not the same in all states. For instance, the household access rate 
is 94.4% in Utah (85.7% access high-speed line, 9.2% access low-
speed lines). The rate in Mississippi is 14% lower than Utah 
(62.3% high and 27.7% low) (US Census, 2014). As a matter of 
fact, the nature of the third-generation social networks make domestic inequality an inevitable phenomenon. One research in 
the US, for example, has demonstrated that a user’s connections 
in social networks has to do with his or her level of education. 
In other words, people with higher education levels are more 
connected in social networks. On the other side of the extreme are the elderly. The same model exists for city residents compared 
to those who live in rural areas (Shepard, 2007, p. 1527). The same research has also shown that the access and connectivity 
for the rich, men and the whites are greater compared to the poor, 
women and blacks respectively. This side of the third-generation 
of social networks and the level of inequality has turned into 
worrisome issues for western scholars. Neubeck & Glasberg, for 
instance, considers domestic inequality a strong impediment to 
social justice and the key factor for social progress (Neubeck & 
Glasberg, 2004, p. 107). When the chance for a new form of communication was made available to developing countries by the third-generation of social 
networks, the tendency to replace the second-generation with it was much greater compared to developed nations. This could probably be explained by the nature and history of traditional communication in developing countries. The warm welcome was 
as a research in the 1980s demonstrated in developing countries 
the connection between an individual with their family, neighbors, 
relatives, friends, etc. would make up 35 sorts of communication 
demands (Wright, 1975, p. 255). However, the rate is expected 
to gradually decline. Adding to that, the functions of the third-
generation social networks in developing countries has been different from developed countries. This is explained by the low speed internet and pint-sized bandwidth combined with software 
issues such as filtering and state control. This difference has also 
changed the structure of the third-generation social networks 
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in developing countries, where lack of access to satisfactory and 
standard local media, intentional or unintentional inability of 
media to fulfil the demands of the users, have made them resort 
to global networks. Evidence shows that the more the third-generation develops and the more the user power increases in the 
third-generation social networks, the state censorship as well as self-censorship will decline. This is part of the capability of which 
people’s connection to social networks challenge the existing social structures and disrupts the long-standing and stagnant 
social orders (Neubeck & Glasberg, 2004, p. 107). 
One of the major characteristics of the third-generation social 
networks in developing countries is the widespread usage of mobile phones among people. A comparison between the internet and the mobile phone usage shows that the former demands a certain level of literacy (ability to read Latin letters) and numerical 
knowledge along with the ability to afford a computer and a 
landline telephone. But when it comes to mobile phones, there is no need for that level of literacy nor the expense. The issue of the fast growth of mobile phone usage along with the high usage 
of the Internet in Iran clearly marks that difference. In fact, the early cellular phones (non-smart ones) managed to easily replace landline telephones as well as the heavy charges of the telegram 
(which also demanded the physical presence at the offices and 
later ownership of lines). In other words, the non-smart mobile phones became the means for the transformation of the second-
generation of social networks in developing countries, with the internet providing the grounds for their public participation in 
the third generation of social networks. 
The first Iranian mobile communication network with only 
9200 lines was launched in Tehran in 1994 (Mo’tamedi, 1997, 
p. 49). From 2002 onwards, the trend witnessed a huge sudden 
growth, so that the figure in 2008 increased 3000 times compared 
to that of 1994 and 12 times more compared to 2001 (30 Years 
of Communications, 2009, p. 21). According to Iran’s Ministry of 
Communications, the rate has been the highest in the Middle East 
(Kheyrkhah, 1998).
Four years after its international introduction, the short 
message system was opened in the Iranian network, covering 
half of the users in 2004 and spreading to all the 8.6 million lines 
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in 2006 (interview with Public Relations Chief of the Iranian Telecommunications Company). The spread was massively 
received by the public and on the eve of the new Persian Year (in 
March 2008) alone, some 215 million congratulatory text messages 
were exchanged among Iranian users, despite the fact that 53% of 
the Iranian cities had no mobile coverage back )Kheyrkhah, 1998, p. 4). In addition to using mobile phones for traditional customs 
such as messages on New Year eves and religious occasions, the 
Iranian social network, also exchanged jokes, and sarcastic texts 
mainly with political themes. In fact, they were short because 
the non-smart phones offered limited characters, insufficient 
for more serious, lengthy and analytical messages. Based on the 
latest statistics, 85% of Iranians possess mobile phones, while the 
figure for internet access is a mere 28% (the rates in the US are 
respectively 100 and 87) (CIA, 2015b). However, the variance for distribution and access in Iran is relatively high. In addition to 
the above-mentioned difference in comparing the two countries, the inequality in the speed of internet and the bandwidth are 
significant issues. Furthermore, as was the case with the early years of the development in the second-generation of social 
networks, here again, there is an unequal distribution combined with a wide gap between rural and urban populations as well as the educated and the uneducated with regards to internet access which has made the model of the third-generation of 
social networks in a developing country like Iran quite different 
from developed countries. For instance, until 2005, no Iranian 
village had access to the internet. Four years later, only in 9300 
there were ICT offices (2009 Statistics, p. 11). That means 85% 
of the country’s villages, meaning 40% of the population had 
no internet access (figures from 2007 Statistics Yearbook, p. 
110) and considering the people who accessed the net through 
ICT offices in those 9300 villages were deprived from the level 
of free access in cyberspace as enjoyed by users with personal 
computers. Indeed, in many Iranian towns, there are lots of people glued to their mobile phones while they have no access to the net 
or even have any idea about it. Even though they may only use the 
text message system, since using the internet demands certain 
level of knowledge about other languages specifically English as 
well as computer skills, thus, using the internet becomes almost 
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impossible for them. As a result, those Iranians who replace their ordinary phones with the new smart ones might not have 
the same status in terms of their social networking activity 
compared to users in a developed English-speaking country. The above-mentioned facts indicate the same difference of usage in 
developing and developed countries alike. They emerged in the 
second generation of social networks but exist through the third 
generation as well. This has been illustrated in Figure 4. On the 
right side, one can see the model of the third generation of social 
networks in developed countries, which is completely nationwide and is in the form of similar shapes domestically interconnected 
with the capability of links to the outside-world networks. The model on the left is for developing countries. On the upper right of 
the model there is a partial network which has all the features of the 
third generation with a status similar to that of developed countries, from which the connection to the outside world is made possible. 
On the left, there is a large circle in which there are members who 
technically enjoy staying in the third generation of social networks 
thanks to their access to facilities as well as national and individual will. They can even use the old second-generation means plus non-smart cell phones that are widely interconnected in the third-generation circle. There are also portions of the population that 
are still part of the first generation. Among them are people with a 
nomadic lifestyle living in remote mountains and deserts, residents of small-population villages in deprived provinces as much as 11 
million people over the age of 15 who are still illiterate. 
Figure 4. A model of social networks formed by internet in developing nations such 
as Iran (a combination of first, second and third generations) alongside the relatively 
homogenous and widespread third-generation network in developed countries.  
Facilities, National and Individual Will in Battling Inequality 
The change in communication ecosystems, better understanding of the virtual space and greater participation in the third 
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generation of social networks are not gained through individual 
or national will alone. Indeed, reducing the inequality examined and discussed through the three theories of communication 
ecosystems, dual spacization, and the three generations of 
communication networks, demands a relative balance of elements 
making up facilities as well as individual and national will. The 
parameters in question could be categorized into the following: 
A. National will and facilities
1. Nationwide electricity network
2.   Availability of equipment and centers needed for widespread distribution of internet access across the country 3. Providing necessary bandwidth for maximum usage of the worldwide web
4. Facilities for full mobile phone coverage in all parts of the country
5. Supplying the necessary hardware and software for 
synchronizing and merging the mobile phone network with the internet access
6. Providing essential hardware and software for merging the 
mobile phone network with media 
7. Eliminating all sorts of media monopoly and preparing the necessary grounds for free competition in media production and distribution 
8. Providing literacy programs to people stuck in rural locations 
still using old generation of communication networks (first and second generation)
9. Transforming existing paper data banks (libraries, archives, etc.) into digital data bases and resources 
10. Availability of state and private sector services in digital 
social networks 
11. Accepting the freedom of access in the digital network and the de facto freedom of the internet 
B. Individual will and facilities 
1. Financial ability to afford necessary tools like computers, 
smart phones, etc. to establish genuine participation in 
digital networks 
2. Having access to a level of education proportionate with 
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the level needed for participation in digital networks both in the national and the international languages3. Motivation to experience new and alternative forms of technology and communication
4. Personal positive experiences in using digital networks; 
A Suggested Model and Index for Presenting the Status of the 
Three Social Networks in the Contemporary World It is possible to use international indexes (such as penetration 
ratio of internet, speed and band-width in each country, the ratio 
of landline telephones, cell phones and smart phones in 100 and etc.) to offer a more precise model on the status of global inequality based on the three discussed theories. The result of 
such an analysis is shown in Table 1. The first row indicates digital 
social networks, whose indices are calculated in six lines and are 
then used to compare a developed country, the United States with 
a developing country, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The details are 
as follows: 
The first row includes the internet penetration rate at 84.2% in 
the US and 31.4% in Iran. The second row shows figures of the first row as the area of two circles in square centimeters. In the third 
row, the radiuses of the circles in the second row are calculated 
as 5.2 and 3.2 cm. The fourth row compares the bandwidth of 
the two countries as taken from resources. In the fifth row, the 
bandwidth in the US (64089) is shown as 1, thus the figure for Iran 
is 0.256 in comparison. The sixth row seeks to find the difference of the internet bandwidth and speed in various countries using the 
factor of the ‘facility index’. For instance, a user in Sweden enjoys a 
bandwidth 55 times more than a user in India and 38 times higher 
than another user in Niger (Fastmetrics, 2016). The basis of the index will be a combination of the bandwidth and the speed in any country compared to the global average (the present study has 
taken 146 nations in 2013). The study of those countries found an 
average bandwidth of 115798 and an average speed of 5.347 Mbps. 
Now, if one takes X for the bandwidth and Y for the speed in the 
following formula, the figures for the US and Iran will respectively 
be 0.345 and 045. 
The second section which has to do with the oral network is 
made up of three rows. The first row indicates the illiterates in 
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2013, 1% were in the US and 15% were in Iran. The second row 
deals with the first-line figures as areas of two circles in square 
centimeters. In the third row the radiuses of the circles are taken as 
0.2 and 2.2 cm2. And the third row is about the second-generation 
network or the long-distance communication network. The three 
rows contain the following information: 
Table 1. Existing indices and facility index for one developed and one developing country Social Network Model Factors Developed Developing 
Digital Network 1 Internet Penetration Rate 84.2% 31.4% 2 Are – Digital Network Circle 84.2 31.4 3 Radius – Digital Network Circle 5.2 3.2 4 Internet Bandeidth 64089 4632 5 Internet Speed 1 0.256 6 Internet Bandwith and Speed Index 0.345 0.042 
Oral Network 1 Percent age of illiterate 1 15 2 Are of Oral Network Circle 1 15 3 Radius-Oral Network Circle 0.2 2.2 
Tele Network 1 Area – Tele Network Circle 14.8 53.6 2 Radius- Tele Network Circle 2.2 4.1 
General Information - Population 318892103 80840713 - Number of Landline Phones 139000000 28760000 - Number of Cellular Phones 310000000 58160000 - Number of Smart Cellular Phones 173000000 697920 - Total Landline and non-Smart Cellular Phones 176000000 86222080 8 Total Landline and non_Smart Cellular Phones Per Capita 55 107 
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The first row represents the area of the two circles showing 
the share of this generation of networks compared to the other two. The easiest and most practical way to calculate it is to reduce the total of the areas of the two circles of the two digital and 
oral networks from 100. Since it was shown in the rows of the 
two previous sections that the 84.2 units in the US can become 
members of the digital social network and the illiterate make up 
1% of the population, and then 14.8 units are members of the 
second generation or the long-distance network. The second row 
deals with the first-line figures as areas of two circles in square 
centimeters. In the third row the radiuses of the circles are taken 
as 2.2 and 4.1 cm2. 
For a more tangible picture of the second-generation 
networks, the fourth section of the table offers general data on 
the population, number of landlines, cell phones, smart phones 
and the sum of those figures per 100 people. 
For the circles in the above table, the one representing digital 
networks in countries without filtering were drawn without a 
border, while the ones suffering from filtering were shown with 
dotted border. Meanwhile, the ‘facility index’ was shown as a 
column inside the circle of digital networks. Figure 5 displays 
three different generations of social networks in Iran and the 
United States based on 2013 statistics. 
Figure 5. Circles representing the three generations of social networking in Iran and the 
United States in 2013.The research also shows to calculate the area of the three circles 
showing the status of social networking on the first generation 
(oral), second generation (long distance) and third generation 
(digital) from the bottom to the top for all the countries, then 
the order would be a triangle, a rectangle and an upside-down triangle. 
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Therefore, if the area calculated for the first generation is 
larger than the other two, as with the case of Niger in Figure 6, it would be shown as a triangle. If the total area of each generation 
is equal, it would be shown as a rectangle like the case of India 
and if the third or digital generation is bigger, then it would be an 
upside-down triangle like the case of Sweden. 
Figure 6. The arrangement of circles representing social networks in different countries 
shown inside a triangle, a rectangle and an upside-down triangle.  
(Sweden, India, Niger) 
The following is an explanation on the above arrangements:
1. Triangle arrangement 
It refers to countries in which the majority of the population are 
still members of the first-generation social networks, such as 
Niger, where 71.3% of the inhabitants are illiterate and the internet 
penetration rate is only 1.7%. The country with a population 
of 17.5 million people has only 116 thousand landline phones. 
However, there are some 5.4 million non-smart cell phones which 
make up a 27% share in the circle shown in the model. Therefore, the largest circle which is the one in the bottom is related to 
the first generation with a share of 71.3%. The second circle 
represents the second generation with a 27% share, while the 
top circle showing the digital generation has received only a 1.7% 
share. One could generalize this, saying countries with a triangle 
arrangement are suffering from a chronic lack of knowledge. The population in those countries will be informed only in case 
of media focus and hype and when the partial networks in use 
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between the other two circles make the population aware about a particular fact. 
2. Rectangular arrangementCountries which have an equal or larger circle representing 
their second generation compared to the other two circles fit a 
rectangular arrangement in the model. One case is India, where 
37.2% of the population of over 1.2 billion is illiterate, the internet 
penetration rate is 15.1% and the share of the second-generation 
networking is 47.7%. In India, there are only 31 million landline 
phones, while the number for cell phones is some 893 million. In 
such countries, members of the digital networking generation can easily transmit the news about social situations and the activities of the ruling and powerful elite to the others through one-to-
one, one-to-some and one-to-all forms of communication, and 
at the same time share their views, beliefs and interpretations. 
However, they lack the means to establish the contact with the other two generations namely the other two circles. The residents in the second-generation circle have access only to long-distance communication which are meant only for conveying short messages in the forms of one-to-one and one-to-some and not 
the one-to-all communication. They can also make very short 
comments in the size of the old telegrams. In fact, here sharing 
cannot go beyond short messages, and is rather expressed as a 
feeling or a joke and fails to reach the people in the circle which 
housed members of the digital generation social networking. 
In other words, those people have the facility to acquire the 
information, but the information mainly comes from traditional masses rather than new and modern media tools. 
The residents of the circle representing the first generation have no provision or means to establish long-distance contact 
with the members of the other two circles, thus suffering from a 
state of chronic media blackout. They do at times sneak into the other two circles through the small holes to access information and that is when media begin to highlight a certain issue. Then 
the first-generation users will receive information in a multi-
staged process, consuming a superficial level of information from the other two circles. It seems that regarding the level of 
knowledge on their surrounding environment, in the rectangular 
Jo
ur
na
l o
f C
yb
er
sp
ac
e 
Po
lic
y 
St
ud
ie
s  
   V
ol
um
e 
1 
   N
o.
 1
    
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
82
Mehdi Mohsenian Rad
arrangement, people from different walks of life are categorized in three separate groups and are more or less deprived from the depth of views and the opinions of others. 
3. Upside-down triangle arrangement 
The countries where the digital network has a greater share compared to the other two circles are covered in the upside-
down triangle arrangement. One example is Sweden, in which 
the ratios of the three circles for the first and second generations 
are respectively 1 and 4.2 units, while the figure for the third 
generation is 94.8% (World Bank, 2015). It is in this arrangement 
that the majority of people have access to information provided by monitors on social situations and the performance of the ruling system and the powerful elite. Here the communication is easily 
made possible through one-to-one, one-to-some and one-to-all channels and users have the chance to share their comments and 
interpretations with others. The larger social network here is 
practically very much similar to the partial networks of the 18th 
century prior to the advent of the post, telegram and telephone. 
The difference is the fact that in the past, such communications stipulated physical presence in a certain geographical point. But 
now, in the case of Sweden for instance, it is the common beliefs and topics of interest which gather people in one spot. There is 
also another crucial difference: the various small and unstable 
partial networks in the digital generation can rapidly join and 
create a unified powerful majority with common and equal levels 
of information. One example is what happened in the wake of the 
2015 terror attacks on the Paris-based Charlie Hebdo office. 
Still, there are societies, in which digital social networks suffer 
from slow internet speed and a pint-sized bandwidth, leading to 
problems in information feeding. More importantly, state-imposed 
filtering can exacerbate the situation and cause information 
malnutrition, because the users will have to acquire and consume the information they demand not from their own circle rather from the border of other circles. Although there are widespread 
and cheap proxies that allow users access blocked data, they bring about new problems which affect the consumption of information. 
Apparently, the forms of the two triangular and rectangular 
arrangements may look the same in democratic and undemocratic 
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societies. Still, there are differences from within. In democratic 
societies, the residents using the digital networks have access 
to the free flow of information and therefore play a key role in affecting the content of the data as it is being transmitted through 
the entire three networks. In fact, in those countries as the arrangement moves from the rectangle shape to the upside-down 
triangle, the ruling system will be more vulnerable and will have a harder time trying to hide facts and convince the society about 
issues which are of public ramifications. However, for countries which have the triangle and rectangle shapes but no democratic 
system, there are residents in the first-generation network who 
fall victims to the state-led short-term populist propaganda. Here, 
those in the second-generation network may decide to criticize the 
ruling authoritarianism, but that won’t go beyond simple short-
message jokes. Indeed, the sole merit of the second-generation 
network for them will be merely emptying their anger and getting 
it off their chest through jokes and nothing more. And here the 
users of the third-generation network will be only analyzers of the system’s performance within their own circle without having the 
power to affect the entire population and the other two networks. 
Concluding Remarks
Up until the turn of the 18th century, people in different countries, 
no matter how educated or wealthy, were more or less members 
of oral partial networks. Under normal circumstances, they were thinly connected and the bond would become stronger in critical 
situations. All in all, the first generation would make up an oral 
national network. In the early 19th century, however, in a matter 
of only 37 years, three major tools of communication, namely 
the post, the telegram and the telephone, were introduced and changed the already existing traditional modes of commutation. 
In developed countries, the change rapidly led to the development 
of a new third generation of social networks which connected the 
earlier long-distance communication networks into a one unified 
network. In underdeveloped countries and later the developing 
countries, nevertheless, it merely led to the formation of three 
separate networks which led to the emergence of a new era of domestic inequality in information access. Since the end of the 
20th century, the internet came to the public sphere, creating 
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the third generation or digital networks. The new development brought forth a cyberspace alongside the real world on the one 
hand; on the other, it created the chance for mass messaging of 
information at the hands of the public, something which used to be exclusively controlled by powerful rulers. This prepared the grounds for altering the communication ecosystem which is the 
fruit of ‘the message or the massed message’. In the meantime, 
the emergence of the third-generation networks not only brought about inter-nation inequalities as witnessed during the advent of the second generation it also enforced the phenomenon of 
domestic inequality which had never existed before. Indeed, in the 
new generation of social networks, it was the individual facilities 
and will which began to play a key role (it was no longer only 
about being literate, rather a high level of education and financial ability were needed to afford a computer or a smart phone). As 
a result, the members or potential users of each network were presented in the form of circles. The arrangement of the three 
circles representing the three networks led to larger forms in 
triangular, rectangular and upside-down triangular shapes, each standing for a certain social condition. 
Figure 7. Circulation of social networks from the square shape in the 17th century to 
rectangle, triangle, upside-down triangle and the transformation into a square in the 
future once againAssuming that the arrangement would be a square shape for 
the status of networks prior to the 17th century, it seems that 
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one can draw the conclusion that the same shape will reemerge 
in the future. Then with the likely development of simultaneous translation tools for all languages and the ushering in of the post-
global-village era (market of the message) (Mohsenian Rad, 2005, 
p.1- 38), the single-square arrangement will be able to give rise to a new renaissance by dramatically reducing the communication inequalities. 
Notes
(1) My special thanks go to Dr. Hassan Jamali-Nik in the UK, Dr. Farzin Fahimi in 
Germany, Dr. Elham Amiri-Majazi in Australia, Dr. Abdolreza Zakat Roshandel 
in Canada, Vahid Baqeri in the United States, Dr. Davood Zareian and all my 
students and colleagues in Iran. 
(2) The theory was first raised at the Global Communications Association 
conference in India’s Bangalore in November 2009. The title was ‘Three 
Generations of Social Networking’. One year later, it appeared in the form of 
an article entitled: ‘Three Generations of Social Networking; An Overlapped 
Presence in Developing Countries: The Case of Iran’ and was published in 
Allameh Tabatabaee’s Journal of Social Sciences (Mohsenian Rad, 2012, p. 37-
74). Four years later, the theory was completed in a four-year-long joint project 
with Dr. Babak Rahimi, associate professor at the University of California, Saint 
Deigo. The title was modified and pursued as ‘the three-dimensional share of 
social networks in different world communities’. 
(3) One could trace back the origin of the second generation of social networks 
in the development of post stamps, which in turn emerged in the West 
following an American act ratified in September 1789 on a road building 
project which led to the creation of a nationwide mailing system. In 1913, it 
had already connected the entire nation’s towns and villages through a wide-
ranging, overarching web.
References
Adler, R. B., & Rodman, G. (2009). Understanding Human 
Communication. (Tenth Edition). New York: Oxford University Press.
Ameli, S. R. (2011). A Dual Spacized Approach to Harms, Crimes, 
Laws and Policies of the Cyberspace. Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications.
Blew, R. D. (1996). On the definition of ecosystem. Bulletin of the 
Ecological Society of America, 77(3), 171-173.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2015a). The World Fact book. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
Jo
ur
na
l o
f C
yb
er
sp
ac
e 
Po
lic
y 
St
ud
ie
s  
   V
ol
um
e 
1 
   N
o.
 1
    
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
86
Mehdi Mohsenian Rad
world-factbook/geos/er.html. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2015b). The World Fact book. 
Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/us.html. 
Fastmetrics. (2016). Internet speeds by country. Available at 
https://www.fastmetrics.com/internet-connection-speed-by-country.php.
Fourth Plan Report (n. d). The Report on the Pahlavi Government’s 
Fourth Development Plan. Tehran: Management and Planning Organization Publication. 
Hardeman, A. A. (2003). The Worldwide History of 
Telecommunications. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Historical Statistics. (1976). U.S. Bureau of the Census. Historical 
Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970. 
Bicentennial edition. Washington: GPO.
Kheyrkhah, T. (1998). Mobile Phones and their Impact on Relations 
among University Students. The Case of Students in Tehran. 
Master Thesis. Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran. Iran. 
McLuhan, H. M. (1998). For Understanding the Media. Tehran: 
Islamic Republic Broadcasting Center for Evaluation, Study and Research. (Translated into Persian by Saeid Azari)
Mohsenian Rad, M. (2005). Market of the Message and the Future of Intercultural Communications. Journal of Social Sciences, 
31, 1-38. 
Mohsenian Rad, M. (2012). Three Generations of Social Networking; 
an Overlapped Presence in Developing Countries: The Case of Iran. Journal of Social Sciences, 57, 47-74. 
Mohsenian Rad, M. (2015). Communication Ecosystem Contexts: 
From Mass Audiences to Mass Messages. GSTF Journal on 
Media & Communications, 17 (2), 9-17. 
Neubeck, K. J. & Glasberg, D.S. (2004). Sociology: Diversity, Conflict, 
and Change, with PowerWeb. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education.
Mo’tamedi, E. (1997). Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone: 
Past, Present and Future. Tehran: Madreseh Publications.
Mosaheb, G. H. (2002). Persian Encyclopedia. First Volume. Tehran: Amir Kabir. 
Panteli, N. (Ed.). (2009). Virtual Social Networks: Mediated, Massive 
Jo
ur
na
l o
f C
yb
er
sp
ac
e 
Po
lic
y 
St
ud
ie
s  
   V
ol
um
e 
1 
   N
o.
 1
    
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
87
The Impacts of Global Inequality in Social Networks:  Examined in Three Major Theories
and Multiplayer Sites. UK. Palgrave Macmillan.
Postman, N. (2000, June). The humanism of media ecology. In 
Proceedings of the Media Ecology Association (Vol. 1, pp. 10-
16).
Shepard, J. M. (2007) Sociology. Ninth edition, Belmont, ca: 
Thomson/Wadsworth, USA.
Statistics Yearbook. (1966). Tehran, Iran Statistics Center.  
Statistics Yearbook. (2007). Tehran: Iran Statistics Center.  
Tansley, A. G. (1935). The use and abuse of vegetational concepts and terms. Ecology, 16(3), 284-307.
The World Bank. (2015). Internet users (per 100 people). Available 
at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2.
Thirty Years of Communications. (2009). Thirty Years of 
Communications and the Activity Record of the 9th 
Administration. Government Week Special Edition. Tehran: 
Iran Telecommunications Company, Public Relations Office. 
Wood, J. T. (2010). Communication Mosaics: An Introduction to the 
Field of Communication. Boston: Wad S. worth.
Wright, C. (1975). Mass Communication: A Sociological Perspective. 
New York: Random House.
US Census. (2014). Available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs- 
 Zahryardi, B. (1849). First Volume. (Assyrians’ Mission Newspaper). 
Zaleski, J. (1997). The Soul of Cyberspace. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
